Proposing the Financial Invention Review Board: Part 1, powers
By: David A. Smith
Before we unleash a new financial drug on the world, might it require some clinical field trials? That question lies behind a fascinating Harvard Business Review op-ed by of all people and places, Lawrence Candell from MIT’s Lincoln Laboratories:
What can you do in a democracy when you rely on the private sector for solutions in an area of critical national importance?

The few … the proud … the highly paid
The abstract answer is, contract purely technical functions, reserve essentially governmental functions for publicly accountable bodies. But that answer begs the next question: what functions are sufficiently technical?
One inherently governmental function is the setting of compulsory standards (of disclosure, capitalization, or trading). With a few exceptions, that business of compulsory standard-setting cannot be left to private entities, for they invariably either form cartels or structure the rules to maximize their upside and minimize their downside. Enter the government:
In the case of

Can this approach be applied to financial products?
Right now, we have seen the emergence of standard-setting or standard-scoring bodies of greater or lesser independence, sophistication, standard-imposing power, and effectiveness: FASB, the Basel II accords, SEC, and the rating agencies. None of them is really akin to Lincoln Labs, or its fellow travelers of Greater Cambridge – in this context, both

And Lincoln Labs, where they build things
These centers are stocked with technology experts and innovation capabilities [A] as good as those to be found in industry, but [B] they answer only to the public, [C] not to profit-seeking shareholders.
Mr. Candell’s summary contains three suppositions: equality of capability, public accountability, and non-profit status. The third of these, [C] non-profit status, is in my view not essential, since non-profits can in some cases be just as venal as for-profit entities. A better formulation for [C] is that Testing Centers be [C] free from potential conflicts of interest, a condition which can be achieved in several different ways (to which we’ll return below).
[D] Seated across the table from large defense contractors, [E] federally funded R&D centers function as independent honest brokers:
Now Mr. Candell’s summary adds two postulates to give the Testing Centers clout: [D] mandatory pre-usage engagement between the proponent and the
They allow innovative defense contractors to thrive, as the system needs them to do, but they also check the contractors’ occasional temptation to do what is most profitable rather than what is really needed.

Mmm … profits
I’m no expert on defense-contractor review, and Mr. Candell is, so let’s take as fact his assertion of the Testing Centers’ effectiveness both in checking the taking of unnecessary financial risk (by the government) and in not inhibiting the free. Can this be made to work in finance?
These centers clearly perform a valuable function, and the cost of funding their expertise is less than 1% of the Defense Department’s budget.
Well, 1% of DoD’s $650 billion is still a gargantuan number – but if the Testing Centers really perform the function, that would be money well spent. And that much money would buy you a lot of smart reviewers.
As the financial crisis erupted in late 2008, some of my colleagues and I couldn’t help wondering why there was no similar setup in the financial industry.
There was supposed to be such a setup. They were called ‘rating agencies’ and they abdicated their responsibilities, preferring to become symbiotes of those they were rating.
Here was another area of extreme national importance. Why didn’t the wizards who were devising new financial instruments in the private sector have a mirror image operating in behalf of the public?
Here’s a key point. Rating agencies were never set up to be mirrors, nor to be windows. They are oracular, and held themselves out as reliable even if inscrutable. Unfortunately, we learned that behind that inscrutability was unreliability.

I have all the answers right here
Of course, there are many public-spirited experts developing and studying next-generation financial solutions at our universities—just as there are many professors working on military technology. But that academic contingent can’t be expected to protect the public interest.
Of course not, for many reasons. (1) They are not chartered with protecting the public interest, so they have no standing to intervene, making independent protest so much noise. (2) They have other things to do – you know, like teach – and can choose to research in their spare time. (3) In pursuit of intellectual freedom, they resist being slaved to tasks imposed by others. (4) In terms of resources brought to bear on individual DoD-related problems, they’re massively outgunned.

I’m only interested in knowledge
To decide how best to invest its resources, the Department of Defense needs understanding and guidance at the systems level. The same would seem to be true for a financial industry that annually moves trillions of dollars.
The Breakthrough Idea
Let’s federally fund an R&D center that, borrowing the best practices of defense research centers, could design, analyze, prototype, and troubleshoot financial innovations, making sure they promoted our economic security and prosperity.

Let’s think out-of-the-egg, shall we?
At this point in the article, I said to myself, Hmm … how could this be made to work?
To start with, why hasn’t it been tried up to now? Several reasons:
1. We didn’t know we needed it. The industry was unregulated and new innovations are generally unregulated.
2. The difficulty of specifying which innovations are material enough to warrant scrutiny.
3. The last fifteen years saw a net deregulation, as financial products evolved much faster than regulatory thinking about them. As the new instruments gained market share, the percentage of financial instruments subject to this kind of scrutiny shrank.
4. The talent updraft. Private-sector employers can and do generally pay much better than their public-sector counterparts.
In any outgunned situation, you need to change the rules, to balance the tension, by providing the government side with something that compensates for its lack of gunnery. Mr. Candell implicitly addresses these with his last two points (D and E) – standing granted by making the review mandatory, and Federal funding adequate to pay for very smart people.

You vant to sell your decadent innovative securities, tovarisch, you pass our checkpoint.
To create these conditions in our imagined Financial Invention Review Board (FIRB), the nation would need (a) a pre-review of every new type of financial product [Or else what? See below. – Ed.], and (b) delegation of review authority – including signoff authority – to the newly created and fully independent FIRB.
The FIRB would then have the following powers:
Financial Invention Review Board: powers
1. To prohibit sale in the
2. To mandate disclosure requirements for said FP. These would go beyond the ‘omit no material fact’ standard representation in offering circulars; it would be much more like an SEC S-1 review, with the FIRB able to demand additional information and to compel its disclosure before approving a sale.
3. To require the issuer or banker of said FP to post liquid collateral, with a secure and independent escrow agent, equal to some ratio established by the FIRB. The FIRB could change the required ratios from time to time, presumably by lowering them based on greater experience.

Want to have power over all finance? Read on!
[Continued tomorrow in Part 2.]


















































