If you can’t define it, you can’t use it: Part 1, the blight-line test
By: David A. Smith
Is blight, like beauty, in the eye of the beholder?

Houses to be condemned to make way for Atlantic Yards in
Or is blight just a planner’s word for a city’s natural messiness?

Does this look blighted to you?
Though the question is metaphysical, the answer is anything but. On that finding of judicial ‘fact’ hinges the most contentious issue in eminent domain for economic development (ED4ED) today, as explored in a protracted City Journal editorial essay by Nicole Gelinas.

Spot the blight: Atlantic Yards
Indeed, what seems an intractable policy problem – when is ED4ED permissible, and when must it be prohibited? – can be reduced to a problem of boundary –what is blight? In turn, the entire problem, over which so many hours of legal wrestling have been held, can be solved easily – the fuzzy boundary has to be construed against the party with power, so either define blight objectively and observably, or eliminate it as a valid reason.
To see why, we must descend the rabbit hole of current jurisprudence, in particular the way ‘blight’ has been redefined out of all observable meaning (Part 1 of this post), and then resurface elsewhere to see how ED4ED is requisite for urban improvement (Part 2), and hence how to reconcile the competing pressures.
1. If property is ‘blighted,’ government can take it. Lost in the political uproar that followed the Supreme Court’s Kelo v. New London 5-4 decision is that the jurisprudence on ED4ED is half a century old, as laid down in a landmark 8-0 decision in 1954 [Same year as Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, another landmark – Ed.], Berman v. Parker. Under Berman, a Supreme Court enraptured with the promise of economic development allowed the District of Columbia Redevelopment Authority to demolish and rebuild a large chunk of southwestern
“64.3% of the dwellings were beyond repair, 18.4% needed major repairs, only 17.3% were satisfactory; 57.8% of the dwellings had outside toilets, 60.3% had no baths, 29.6% lacked electricity, 82.2% had no wash basins or laundry tubs, 83.8% lacked central heating.”
I think anyone today would agree that even in 1954, properties without indoor plumbing, central heating, or running water, constituted blight. Indeed, under today’s laws – absent in 1954 – those buildings could be condemned as unsanitary.

As Justice William O. Douglas, writing for the unanimous court, put it:
Miserable and disreputable housing conditions may do more than spread disease and crime and immorality. They may also suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. They may indeed make living an almost insufferable burden. They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm, [p33] which makes it a place from which men turn. The misery of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a river.
Unfortunately for Justice Douglas’s defenders, the greatest blight now inflicted on many northern urban communities are the slums inside, the high-rise public housing properties such as the French banlieues, all of which should be torn down, and many of which have been torn down or are being torn down.

We’re not sorry to see you go
Justice Douglas was doing more than penning a manifesto. (No one ever accused Justice Douglas of lacking in legal imagination, as when in Roe v. Wade he found that a right to privacy ‘emanates from the penumbra of the Constitution’ – in other words, that were was no Constitutional language to support it.) Here he was grounding the decision in an expanded concept of ‘public health’ so as to argue that blight goes beyond the optical:
In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the
Berman proved to be the opening salvo in a half-century of ever-expanding municipal authority and judicial deference to local findings. In 1984 the Supreme Court even expanded municipal discretion through the Midkiff decision, so that when in 2005 the court upheld
In 2005, in Kelo v.
2. Once ‘blight’ is found, the state can flip property to a private developer. In parallel with the thread of government having a police power to take small parcels and aggregate them into more rational urban uses ran another thread, that the state can contract these basically technical functions to a private third party. Here too it was the supremely confident Douglas who wrote the sweeping apologia:

The firebrand justice: William O. Douglas
Here, one of the means chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area. Appellants argue that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of another businessman. But the means of executing the project are for Congress, and Congress alone, to determine once the public purpose has been established. See Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., supra; cf. Highland v. Russell Car Co., 279 U.S. 253.
The public end may be as well or better served through an [p34] agency of private enterprise than through a department of government — or so the Congress might conclude.
We cannot say that public ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community redevelopment projects. What we have said also disposes of any contention concerning the fact that certain property owners in the area may be permitted to repurchase their properties for redevelopment in harmony with the over-all plan. That, too, is a legitimate means which Congress and its agencies may adopt, if they choose.
Now enters the worm of self-interest, for if the state can gobble up small parcels from small and politically unconnected holders, and bestow them in a bundle on a politically connected private redeveloper, then both the redeveloper and the municipality have a selfish interest in doing so. Land that is redeveloped becomes more valuable. Land that is rezoned becomes more valuable.

Raise the height, raise the value, raze the incumbents
None of this bothered
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well nigh conclusive. In such cases, the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation.
Evidently they trusted their government more back then.
3. By now, the practical definition of ‘blight’ has been diluted into ‘economically underperforming’. If finding a word translates into giving someone more money, then the word is increasingly found. With ‘blight’ the key to unlock potent government power to take property from A and then to give it to B, why then will develop, in short order, an active marketplace in finding blight. [The same thing has happened, on a multi-billion-dollar global scale, in the counterfeiting of certified emission reduction (CER) certificates, otherwise known as carbon credits … but that's another story, about which I may post in the context of

You cannot outreach the long arm of the law
Kelo highlighted this and empowered other opponents of ED4ED, such as in
Brooklyn’s

My $590k says my home isn’t blighted
These new residents weren’t put off by the Metropolitan Transportation Authority’s railyards nearby, and they liked the hardwood floors and airy views typical of such refurbished buildings. They also settled in alongside longtime residents in little houses on quiet streets. Wealthier newcomers joined regulars at Freddy’s, a bar that predated Prohibition. Small businesses continued to employ skilled laborers in low-rise industrial buildings.
Two questions are entangled here:
1. From an urban-vibrancy perspective, would we ‘like’ to see redevelopment?
2. Is the neighborhood ‘blighted’ today?
It’s entirely possible to answer Yes to the first question – making us wish we could assemble the land – and No to the second, meaning we cannot do it, tempted though we may be.

I can resist everything but temptation
Except that it is all too easy to substitute “I am entitled to” for the phrase “I want to” – especially if one is adjudicating for oneself.
The state hasn’t let this inconvenience derail its plans for

I applaud the commission’s consultants
4. When courts confront a blight dispute, they tend to defer to the public agency. Judicial deference to legislative or executive decision-making is generally a sound principle for separation-of-powers.
Property owners have looked to the judiciary to check the overweening grasp of the legislative and executive branches.
Yet the courts seem to have difficulty grappling with the municipality’s economic conflict of interest:
In Brooklyn, Goldstein and his neighbors have lost their lawsuits—most recently, in

Goldstein’s got his dander up
Except that the harm is unbalanced, because either way, the decision is irrevocable. If a court finds blight, then owners are dispossessed of their property – uprooted. With that dispossession goes their entire way of life. I’m especially sensitized to this by all my global South experience, where slum dwellers are routinely dispossessed of land, once it has become valuable. The slumdwellers lack legal title – they gained their occupancy rights by squatting – so their claim is weaker, but the principle is the same: occupancy vests political legitimacy.
The court essentially abdicated its duty to protect property owners from the governor and the Legislature.

I choose to abdicate my duty
That’s City Journal’s conclusion, not ours, but it’s in line with the factual record.
[Continued tomorrow in Part 2.]
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