History of US public housing: Part 5, the cities hit bottom
[Continued from the preceding Part 1, Part 2, Part 3 and Part 4.]
[For more on my views of public housing, see Public housing: the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come (June, 2006), Public housing’s Gordian’s knot (December, 2006), and The essential housing authority (September, 2007). Dozens of marvelous photographs are in the LaGuardia-Wagner archives.]
As we’ve seen in prior parts of this history of public housing using MIT Professor Lawrence Vale’s comprehensive study, From the Puritans to the Projects, public housing was a natural outgrowth of the reformist initiatives – first church, then philanthropists, and finally government took on the challenge of providing quality housing – out of beneficence, one might say – to those who could not afford it. A common theme running through all these efforts was that housing affordability for the poor could not be the province of private-sector robber barons. Plutocrats and grandees could not possibly care about the poor; they could not possibly deliver housing quality and affordability at the same time.

Affordability? Or economics? Choose before the ice cream cones melt!
By placing itself as the owner/ operator of public housing – as well as its source of regulation and subsidy – government drew all the threads of power into its own hands. Yet government is not monolithic or steadfast; if anything its behavior is akin to a person suffering from both multiple personalities (many voices in Congress and an administration) and periodic total amnesia (change of government). An amnesiac schizophrenic is not whom you want doing the very tough job of affordable housing finance and ownership – in fact it’s probably the worst owner you could have. Its good intentions are no help whatsoever; in fact they shield government from accountability for its own actions.
And from mission creep. It’s entirely understandable, if devastating in the long run, that government would choose to add extra missions onto public housing. It became the refuge for the poorest of the poor; a device for social change; and a convenient resting place for local patronage.
During a decade (roughly 1963 through 1973), public housing went extremely poor, and largely black. Several factors combined to make tipping (as it was and is known) inevitable. The housing was institutional:
Elizabeth Wood, consultant hired to assess BHA properties (1962): “According to its image, public housing has inferior architecture; looks institutional; is inhabited by people who are inferior by virtue of their residence or because they are all on public assistance, or because the projects are rife withy crime and muggings, or because they are spied on by management which makes them turn out their lights by ten o’clock but allows crime to rampage.” Page 284.
With limited resources, public welfare departments used public housing as “the housing of last resort,” the place for the poorest of the poor. Average incomes plummeted:
“Nationally, between 1961 and 1970, the median family income of non-elderly public housing tenants declined from 47% to 37% of the

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Facing limited resources, housing authorities sent to public housing their poorest, many of them on welfare:
Beginning in the mid-1960s, as more and more economically desperate families pressed for admission to public housing, service agencies sought ways to place their clients. As early as 1964, the Welfare Department itself regularly sent letters attempting to intercede on behalf of its clients. By the end of the 1960s more than two-thirds of household in
By 1966, public housing had become ultra-poor, and predominantly black:
National Commission on Urban Problems: “The statistical data show that public housing is reaching the lowest income families among those who apply. If anything, public housing developments are becoming isolated colonies of the poorest, least competitive elements of society.” Page 315

Moving to the poorest of the poor destroyed any hope of economic viability short of subsidy. As I wrote two years ago:
Faced with these new competitors, public housing has gradually become ‘the housing of last resort,’ where dwell ‘the poorest of the poor,’ though neither of these were among the program’s original objectives.

Over time, public housing migrated to a customer base that cannot afford even the operating costs.
Public housing was pushed into this corner by exclusion — each new wave of superior-quality production carved away a top slice of its eligible-resident universe, leaving public housing with income concentration.
In the Fifties and Sixties, urban income concentration meant black. As a result, public housing’s tipping coincided with two other great waves that shook

I grew up in a properly liberal


In very short order, we had, played out on our television screens:
Court-ordered busing and public housing integration.

Defiant and sometimes violent confrontations between

Pitched battles among gangs at the public housing properties, and national political crisis.

Television played its revolutionary part: we had never seen anything like this happening in real time in our living rooms. This wasn’t the

Integration took twenty years, and even today, the scars linger. We can see it in the aging generation of reverse-racist tenant leaders who cling to a shrinking and crumbling power base in tenant-run co-operatives like Bromley-Heath.
In this political gunfight, public housing as a policy suffered mortal collateral damage. As the locus of crime and race and poverty, public housing was tarred with a brush that has stained it in the public mind for thirty-five years since. The projects were seen a failure – a physical failure (deteriorating and wretched conditions), a social failure (crime, unemployment), and a financial failure (sucking Federal money seemingly without end). Catering to those in the bottom quartile, limited in their revenues too 25% (later 30%) of income, the housing authorities were locked into a money-losing proposition. Dependent on subsidy, they had to beg for money, and what came from the state or the Feds was never enough. (In their defense, I note that most housing authorities were shamefully inefficient with subsidy resources, so criticism of fiscal irresponsibility were and today still are often valid.)
By 1968, housing authorities were financially destitute:
According to HUD, half of the nation’s eighty major housing authorities are losing money, and seven of the ten largest are near bankruptcy. Page 337.

Mill Creek, Philadelphia, built 1958-62
Public housing could not keep itself above water as the cities sank around them. Indeed, by the mid-1970s the public housing system was (in the words of a court-pointed Master of the Boston Housing Authority):
[a] culture of “no accountability for forty years, except to political favors and poor people who can’t say anything.” (Page 340)
In 1979,

In explaining his decision, Garrity blamed the BHA Board for “gross mismanagement, non-feasance, incompetence and irresponsibility” that had led to “indescribable conditions” and “incalculable human suffering” in
Few other large housing authorities were in any better shape.
Harry’s arrival was greeted with the fanfares normally reserved for the divine. As Vale puts it:
Spence – a charismatic thirty-three-year-old

[Concluded in Part 6.]
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