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	<title>Comments on: Bailout or bonanza?  Part 1: what do you do?</title>
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	<link>http://affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/us/2008/09/bailout-or-bonanza-part-1-what-do-you-do.html</link>
	<description>Affordable Housing Institue</description>
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		<title>By: endorendil</title>
		<link>http://affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/us/2008/09/bailout-or-bonanza-part-1-what-do-you-do.html/comment-page-1#comment-13354</link>
		<dc:creator>endorendil</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 15:32:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/us/2008/09/bailout-or-bonanza-part-1-what-do-you-do.html#comment-13354</guid>
		<description>excellent explanation. Two things that bother me, though.

First, the Treasury will NOT be buying all fake Vermeers and real ones. It will be buying about 5% of them. Anyone who knows that they have a velvet Elvis will sell it to them. So they are llikely to end up with mostly Elvises. Because the sellers will be dumping their known bad assets first, they will depress prices. To the extent that they get away with it, they could actually depress prices for assets that ARE valuable. 

Second, the banks will sit on 95% of the paintings after all this is over. If the Treasury does no more than buy at a price it thinks reasonable, then that will not achieve squat, as it does not form a basis for a re-evaluation of these paintings. After the bailout, the banks have not had a price discovery process, and so are in the same spot they were before. Minus 5%. If the selling process ends up depressing prices further (by making it look like there are more Elvises in each asset class than is really the case), they may be worse off. A lot worse...

The problem is that an illiquid instrument that depends on the health of the global economy as well as microscopic factors (the exact houses that form the collateral) can not be made liquid unless everyone agrees on a valuation model. Banks cannot agree on the valuation model anymore, and there may actually not be a reasonable model for the current economic circumstances. There is nothing Paulson can do about that. Or anyone else.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>excellent explanation. Two things that bother me, though.</p>
<p>First, the Treasury will NOT be buying all fake Vermeers and real ones. It will be buying about 5% of them. Anyone who knows that they have a velvet Elvis will sell it to them. So they are llikely to end up with mostly Elvises. Because the sellers will be dumping their known bad assets first, they will depress prices. To the extent that they get away with it, they could actually depress prices for assets that ARE valuable. </p>
<p>Second, the banks will sit on 95% of the paintings after all this is over. If the Treasury does no more than buy at a price it thinks reasonable, then that will not achieve squat, as it does not form a basis for a re-evaluation of these paintings. After the bailout, the banks have not had a price discovery process, and so are in the same spot they were before. Minus 5%. If the selling process ends up depressing prices further (by making it look like there are more Elvises in each asset class than is really the case), they may be worse off. A lot worse&#8230;</p>
<p>The problem is that an illiquid instrument that depends on the health of the global economy as well as microscopic factors (the exact houses that form the collateral) can not be made liquid unless everyone agrees on a valuation model. Banks cannot agree on the valuation model anymore, and there may actually not be a reasonable model for the current economic circumstances. There is nothing Paulson can do about that. Or anyone else.</p>
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		<title>By: Louis Buda</title>
		<link>http://affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/us/2008/09/bailout-or-bonanza-part-1-what-do-you-do.html/comment-page-1#comment-13348</link>
		<dc:creator>Louis Buda</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 14:02:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/us/2008/09/bailout-or-bonanza-part-1-what-do-you-do.html#comment-13348</guid>
		<description>Some of those bonds (packaged collaterized debt) are good - The mortgages are being paid off.
The problem is trying to separate the good from the bad.  This should be brought out in the 
discussion, I believe.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Some of those bonds (packaged collaterized debt) are good &#8211; The mortgages are being paid off.<br />
The problem is trying to separate the good from the bad.  This should be brought out in the<br />
discussion, I believe.</p>
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		<title>By: Eric Mauro</title>
		<link>http://affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/us/2008/09/bailout-or-bonanza-part-1-what-do-you-do.html/comment-page-1#comment-13323</link>
		<dc:creator>Eric Mauro</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 01 Oct 2008 01:38:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://affordablehousinginstitute.org/blogs/us/2008/09/bailout-or-bonanza-part-1-what-do-you-do.html#comment-13323</guid>
		<description>If the securities were such a great buy then private buyers would be snapping them up.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If the securities were such a great buy then private buyers would be snapping them up.</p>
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