Political calculus
Often, when working with public-policy stakeholders, we come up against the question:
“Does the government have sufficient political will?”
I’ve become convinced that the term political will is a trap, because there is no such thing as political will. What we want is political action, and it is triggered not by policy argument but by complex and sophisticated political calculus.
Government is an image illusion that emerges from dozens, hundreds, even thousands of individuals all acting within the government. It only looks like an entity from a distance:
“She’s a full-on Monet. From far away it’s okay, but up close, it’s a big old mess.” –
Developers act when the value equation works. Government acts — at least in policy development — only when key individuals within that government find their political arithmetic works. So let’s introduce the variables of political calculus, in rough causal sequence:
- Political Capital. An elected official’s ability to shape debate, move legislation, or otherwise change policy and rules. The impact bank balance. Fluctuates dramatically. No one succeeds in elected office for long without having acute antennae measuring one’s political capital, and that of others. Accumulates over time, with seniority, electability, mobilizable constituency, and other measures of durable incumbency.
- Political Desire. An elected official’s interest in seeing a particular issue successfully addressed. As one of the five stages of selling, it’s significant because it is the starting point for all policy changes — some elected official somewhere gains political desire to see a particular problem ’solved.’
- Political Cover. A political feint whose purpose is not necessarily to accomplish a stated policy goal but rather … in effect, a sugar-free substitute for political commitment. As it has minimal political risk and modest political cost, can be coined much more freely than political commitment. Often mistaken for political desire.
- Political Cost. A measurable and unavoidable expenditure of political capital for taking an action (political commitment). Since political capital is finite, political costs must be rationed yet it be fully drained.
- Political Risk. An unquantifiable risk that future events will cause a current political commitment to look bad, with the benefit of hindsight, and thus incur a future political cost from a past action. Influenced by the likelihood that an initiative is passed (gain some political benefit), implemented successfully (pick up some more), seen as a success (plus up), and embraced by stakeholders, media scribes, and constituents (double plus).
- Political Commitment. A definitive action, such as a unilateral pledge (”If nominated I will not run, if elected I will not serve“), or public action (e.g. a vote on a critical issue), or committal decision (e.g. a veto, a horse trade) that will anger some constituents (regardless of whether it pleases others). All political commitment incurs political costs runs political risks.
- Political Benefit. An aura of wellbeing and association with success that attaches to elected officials. Generally converts into deposits into the political capital bank.
Put this all together and you have the basic political arithmetic:
Political arithmetic
+ Starting political capital
- Political cost of previous political risks taken
- Political cost of current actions
+ Political benefit from successful past political commitments
+ Political benefit from recent political covers
= Ending political capital
In presenting this calculus, I do not seek to belittle elected officials’ commitment to good policy outcomes because it then leads to the fundamental truth of politics:
Fundamental truth of politics
Those who have negative political capital at the moment of an election …
lose and are not re-elected!
Since every election cycle is equivalent to an evolutionary generation, politics rapidly evolved elected officials who know to the flicker of a voter’s eyebrow just where their political capital stands at any given moment. And just as you can never be too rich or too thin, an elected official can never have too much political capital, because there is always the threat that a past political risk will come due, unexpectedly, as a very large political cost.
In political economic terms, therefore, every action is an investment of political capital in pursuit of a return of future political capital. Each decision is thus a hardheaded economic calculation in which good policy is an attribute, not an intrinsic condition of a political benefit. This leads us to the next political equation: namely, the tipping point of political commitment.
Political commitment
Political Commitment occurs only when:
Political Benefits > [ Political Costs + Expected Cost of Political Risks ]
Pluralistic democracy works by making political benefit obtainable only by delivering customers (voters) good political outcomes … which in a complex society are generally robust policy outcomes. In other words, good policy is a byproduct of an effective pluralistic democracy
Add to this equation two facts of political cyclicality:
Political cyclicality
· Political cycles are way, way shorter than policy development cycles.
· Voters’ memories are often shorter than political cycles (and voters are easily hypnotized or distracted).
Now you are prepared to confront the strategy challenge of successful affordable housing policy.
We hold these political truths to be self-evident:
1. No program is ever created whose sole benefits are long-term. Every program must generate some short-term political benefits.
2. Pilot programs reduce political cost and political risk (because they give the experimenters permission to fail). Additionally, because pilots have a quicker payback, they fit better with the political cyclicality.
“Permission to fail, sir!”
3. If you want macro change, you must drive away political cover because if elected officials can address an issue with political cover (which has minimal downside risk), they will prefer that to political commitment (fraught with political cost and risk).
4. Vaporware, no matter how patently absurd, is political cover for the weak-minded. This is why fluff vaporware is so harmful — in a political Gresham’s law, vaporware drives out policy reform.
” The Force can have a strong influence on the weak-minded.”
5. Macro change seldom arises when things are merely declining. For macro change, things have to be truly desperate (this is why catastrophe is a precondition of fundamental reform). (FHA arose out of the Great Depression. HUD came about after the 1960’s urban riots.] Hence the saying, “before it can get better, it has to get worse.”
6. Sometimes the most effective step is a small increment that changes the political environment. Enough such small increments may tip the political arithmetic. This is a virtuous ’slippery slope.’
7. There are times when the political environment for change is hopeless. In such cases, it is better to do nothing other than create intellectual ammunition. Spending political capital on a gutless Congress is merely wasting effort.
“You got to know when to hold ‘em, know when to fold ‘em, know when to walk away, know when to run.”
8. Just as the seasons turn, so too do the tides of aggregate political capital and political risk tolerance. The closer an election looms, the more likely elected officials are to plump for political cover, vaporware, and nostrums. So if you want to make a major push, do it with plenty of time before the next election!
9. Sometimes your best champions are those grizzled veteran elected officials who have seen parliaments come and go but problems remain. Newcomers are blank slates, terrified of political risk.
“Hello, congressman, congratulations on your election victory, let me explain about affordable housing.”
